Although courts justify the constitutional law of libel with consequential reasoning, the true consequences of liability for harmful speech have never been fully explored. We construct an analytical framework for studying libel law, emphasizing both the positive and negative externalities generated by the publication of information. Our model highlights two distinct decisions that a publisher faces, the verification decision and the publication decision. We first demonstrate that a single damage measure for publication of false libelous information, such as the "damages equal harm" measure, cannot simultaneously induce socially optimal decisions regarding verification and publication. We then argue that the damage measure should depend on the efficacy of the verification process. Interestingly, when verification is reasonably effective, the damage award should be set equal to the social benefit from truthful publication. Our analysis provides a theoretical foundation for important elements of current libel law. It also suggests practicable avenues for reform.
I. INTRODUCTION
The jurisprudence of libel -the tort committed when one damages another's reputation by publishing false information -poses a puzzling contradiction. In devising the constitutional rules governing liability for libel, courts have been explicitly motivated by consequential concerns. Nevertheless, they have adopted doctrines that are, on their face, inconsistent with economic theory.
The most prominent example is the seminal decision of the Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan. 1 In Sullivan, the Court extended constitutional protection to false speech concerning a public figure. Under Sullivan's reading of the First Amendment, false speech could only give rise to liability if the speaker's statements stemmed from "actual malice," i.e., knowledge or recklessness with respect to the falsity of the publication. The Court explicitly grounded its decision in the fear that strict liability for false speech would make "would-be critics of official conduct [become excessively] deterred from voicing their criticism." As Robert Post observed, the purpose of this actual malice requirement is to "attain the specific end of minimizing the chill on legitimate speech" (Post, 1995, p. 153) .
The Court's concern that strict liability for false speech over-deters appears to be at odds with the economic theory of liability. As has been shown, strict liability for torts should result both in the optimal level of care (Landes and Posner, 1987; Shavell, 1987) and in the optimal level of effort to obtain information (Shavell, 1992) .
Addressing this apparent inconsistency, previous literature (Farber, 1991; Hylton, 1996; Posner, 1998; Cooter, 2000) has explained that libel differs from the tort underlying the standard model of liability because the information conveyed by speech is a public good. That is, a newspaper publishing a story is unable to capture, through the price it charges its readers, the story's full social value. 2, 3 1 376 U.S. 254 (1964) . 2 There are two main reasons for a newspaper's inability to capture the full social benefit it produces via publication. First, a newspaper publishing a news item can neither prevent competing newspapers from publishing the item nor exclude the public from learning the information conveyed by the item (Posner, 1998, 733-34) . In theory, this problem could be solved if newspapers offered lower prices to the group of potential readers who attach relatively little value to the timely reading of new news items. A newspaper, however, will generally be unable to engage in perfect price discrimination because it will often be unable to identify those readers.
The second reason for a newspaper's inability to capture the full social benefit from publication concerns the invaluable yet intangible benefits derived from the free flow of ideas guaranteed by the First Amendment. For example, the social benefits associated with the deterrent effect of investigative journalism on corruption by public officials will not necessarily be reflected in readers' willingness to pay for a newspaper. 3 Libel differs from other torts on another dimension. In general, tort doctrine defines strict liability as imposing liability whenever the victim suffers harm. In contrast, according to Since publishers cannot capture the full social benefit of their conduct, holding them strictly liable for the full social harm they cause will result in over-deterrence. Previous literature thus concurs with the Sullivan Court about the inadequacies of strict liability for libel, and supports the Court's move to fault-based liability. This literature, however, has not provided a comprehensive framework for studying libel law. And, therefore, it provides only a partial foundation for current libel doctrine. 4 This paper develops an analytical framework for studying the welfare consequences of alternative liability regimes for libel. 5 Our framework emphasizes the quality of speech as a public good, and the combination of both positive and negative externalities that generally follow from the publication of information. The model is based upon a two-level decisionmaking process for publishers. When a newspaper receives information about a story, it faces two sequential decisions: first, whether and how much to invest in verifying the accuracy of the information; second, given the information the newspaper holds, whether to publish the story. The challenge is to design a liability regime that will provide newspapers with optimal incentives for both verification and publication. As we shall show, focusing on the two distinct decisions made by publishers provides new insights concerning the effects of various liability regimes on publishers' incentives and consequently on social welfare.
The anti-strict-liability approach adopted by the Sullivan Court and endorsed by the legal literature in its aftermath focuses solely on the decision whether to publish. Under this approach, relaxing the standard of liability is necessary in order to mitigate the chilling effect of liability, i.e., to ensure a sufficiently high level of publication. This approach, however, overlooks the effect of liability on the verification decision. As this paper shows, 6 the nature of information as a public good has markedly different implications for the verification and publication decisions. While publishers will be over-cautious in their publication decisions, they will tend to under-invest in verifying the accuracy of the stories existing libel doctrine, truth is a good defense against a claim of libel, regardless of the harm to the victim. We retain this distinctive feature of libel doctrine throughout our analysis. The implications of conventional strict liability are explored in Bar-Gill and Hamdani (2002) . 4 In particular, of the two decisions that a publisher faces, the verification decision and the publication decision, the existing literature has focused entirely on the latter. As explained below, the inadequate treatment of the verification dimension accounts for the inaccurate conclusions reached by previous studies. 5 Other noteworthy contributions include Renas et al. (1983) and Garoupa (1999a,b) . Renas et al. (1983) study a model of liability for libel, different from the one studied in the present paper. In particular, Renas et al. do not model the verification process, which is a central element of our analysis (see below). In addition, Garoupa (1999a,b) studies the tort of defamation, but from a different angle, focusing on the effect of libel law on the ability and incentives of the press to expose and deter political corruption. 6 See Section IV infra. they publish. In many cases, 7 therefore, an optimal level of verification can be induced only if the publisher faces increased liability for publication of false information.
In order to remain faithful to current libel doctrine, we restrict attention to liability regimes under which a publisher will be held liable whenever the information turns out to be false. Ideally, we seek a single policy variable -the level of damages for publishing false information -that can achieve the first-best outcome on both levels, i.e., the first-level decision to verify the information, and the second-level decision to publish the story.
Our first finding is that the conventional "damages equal harm" measure cannot induce socially optimal decisions on both the verification and publication levels. More generally, we show that no single penalty provides accurate incentives for both the verification and publication decisions. Given the twodimensional structure of the libel problem, a more context-dependent liability regime is needed. In particular, a liability rule that is designed to be more sensitive to the efficacy of the verification process can better promote social welfare. We therefore turn to study a regime under which the penalty imposed on the publisher depends on whether it was socially optimal for the publisher to verify the accuracy of the information prior to publication.
The first measure of damages for false publication, imposed when it is socially optimal to verify the information, should be set at the social benefit from publication. As it defies a basic tenant of tort law, a rule setting damages to equal the benefit (and not the harm) produced by the regulated activity clearly needs some justification. 8 We therefore show that this unconventional damage measure leads to efficient verification. We then explain that given the correct level of verification, a socially desirable publication decision will follow.
The intuition underlying the above result is as follows. The social return to verification equals the (net) benefit from publication of truthful information. With inadequate verification, truthful information might not be published, giving way to false information or to no publication at all. If a publisher could capture the social benefits from truthful publication, she would have accurate incentives to invest in verification. But, as we have seen, the public good nature of information precludes this solution. Can we mimic this full internalization ideal via a liability rule? This can be achieved by exploiting the following symmetry. Focusing on the publisher's incentives to invest in verification, an award for publishing true 7 In particular, where the level of the positive externality, the benefit from publication, exceeds the negative externality, the harm from publication. 8 Although counter-intuitive at first sight, the finding that damages should be set to equal the benefit from truthful publication is consistent with the conventional economic analysis of torts. As explained in Section II, under the model we develop the publication of false information may be viewed as the tortuous act and verification as the means of exercising precaution. If the point of reference is taken to be truthful publication, the social loss from publishing false information is the forgone benefit associated with truthful publication.
information is equivalent to a fine for publishing false information. Therefore, setting damages for false publication to equal the (net) benefit from publication of truthful information, will achieve socially optimal verification.
Having ensured efficient verification, we must still show that setting damages to equal the benefit guarantees a correct publication decision. If it is socially desirable to invest in verification, and efficient verification is indeed achieved, then a socially desirable level of publication will necessarily follow. To see this, note that a publisher that invests in verification will base her publication decision on the results of the verification process (otherwise, she will not waste money on verification). Therefore, given efficient verification, the level of publication will also be efficient.
The 'damages equal to benefit' rule is optimal when it is socially desirable to invest in verification prior to publication. There are, however, cases in which it is optimal for the publisher to forgo verification and either to publish or to refrain from publication. These cases are characterized by what we call ineffective verification. Verification is ineffective when the quality of the initial information is especially high, or, more importantly, when the available verification measures are not cost-effective. What should an efficient libel law prescribe in such cases?
As it turns out, it is quite simple to ensure no verification (which is the desirable result), and the challenge is to induce an optimal publication decision. Therefore, the liability rule must be sensitive to the relative magnitudes of the expected benefit and harm resulting from publication. If the expected benefit is dominant it is socially desirable to publish without verification. This can be achieved by setting a sufficiently low level of damages (or even zero damages). On the other hand, if the harm is dominant it is efficient not to publish, again without verification. This can be achieved by setting a sufficiently high level of damages. 9, 10 To summarize, we show that, in theory, a context-dependent liability regime can induce efficient levels of verification and publication. In cases where it is socially desirable for the publisher to invest in verification prior to publication, damages should be set to equal the (net) benefit from publication of truthful information. On the other hand, when efficiency requires no verification, the law should impose either zero damages or high damages, based upon a comparison between the expected benefit and harm from publication. 9 The distinction between scenarios with higher expected benefits from publication (relative to harm) and scenarios with lower expected benefits (relative to harm) resembles the doctrinal distinction in libel law between information pertaining to public figures (or issues) and information pertaining to private figures (or issues). See Section VI, infra. 10 Generally, optimal decisions can be induced by setting the level of damages according to a simple formula. According to this formula the optimal level of damages is a function of the publisher's profit from publication, plus the difference between the harm from publication and the expected benefit from the publication of a true story (multiplied by a positive constant). See Section V, infra.
By focusing on the two distinct decisions made by publishers, this paper develops a framework for evaluating the effects of liability on the prevalence of speech, and provides insight as to the relevant considerations for devising an optimal liability regime for libel. The analytical results derived in this paper do not immediately translate into doctrinal rules. Nevertheless, these results can help guide the courts in developing the law of libel. Moreover, we argue that existing doctrinal tools can be readily modified to promote efficient verification and publication in accordance with our theory. The fault standards adopted by the Supreme Court can be interpreted as measuring the efficacy of the verification process. They may also be used to exempt publishers from liability when it is socially desirable to publish without verification. Similarly, the often-invoked doctrinal distinction between public issues (or figures) and private issues (or figures) can be used to identify cases where higher damages are needed to prevent publication without any verification.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II lays out the framework of the analysis. Section III solves for the socially optimal levels of verification and publication. Section IV studies the newspaper's problem. Section V explores the possibility of inducing socially desirable verification and publication decisions using a liability regime. Section VI draws the implications of the analysis for legal policy, and specifically for libel doctrine. Section VII concludes. The proofs of the propositions presented in the paper are relegated to an appendix.
II. FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS
Our analysis proceeds within the following framework. A newspaper N is considering whether to publish information pertaining to a certain individual. For simplicity, we assume that the newspaper's publication decision is a binary one-the newspaper must choose between publishing and forgoing publication. The information may be either true or false, i.e.,
. Assume that there is an exogenous probability, φ , that the information received by the newspaper is true,
If N publishes the information, the individual will suffer a harm of h. 11 Also, if the information is true, its publication will create a social benefit, b. 12 The newspaper N enjoys a profit of π if it publishes the information. We assume that the newspaper's profit is independent of whether the information turns out to be true or false. 13 However, our 11 We assume that harm is independent of truthfulness. Alternative assumptions are examined in Bar-Gill and Hamdani (2002) . 12 The framework can be readily extended to allow for social harm suffered following a false publication. 13 Our analysis relies on a fundamental distinction between truth-dependent payoffs and truth-independent payoffs. For clarity of exposition, we assume that b is truth-dependent, framework can be readily extended to allow for different profit levels depending on the ex post revealed truthfulness (or falsehood) of the published information. 14 We further assume that b < π to capture the idea that the newspaper cannot capture the full social value of publication.
The newspaper may invest in verifying the content of the information it receives. Formally, N can invest
and obtain a signal
, such that with probability ) (x P the signal uncovers the true content of the information, i.e., i s = , and with probability
. 15 It is natural to assume that 0 ) 0 ( = P ; in other words, there is no signal when there is no investment in verification, 0 = x . Also, as is conventional, we assume that investments in verification suffer from decreasing marginal productivity, i.e., 0 ) (
. Finally, to avoid corner solutions, we assume
The exogenous probability φ can be viewed as the newspaper's prior. If the newspaper decides to invest in verification, it obtains a signal s and updates its prior according to Bayes's rule. If s = t, the newspaper's posterior is:
. 17 while h and π are truth-independent. Note that in order to include the truth-dependent π in the social welfare function, we can simply define h as the net social harm, i.e., gross harm minus π .
14 Truth-dependent profits can represent reputation effects, whereby a newspaper's profit will generally depend on its reputation for accurate reporting. In fact, if reputational forces are strong enough and accurate enough, libel law might be unnecessary. See also note 23 below. Furthermore, reputation effects are not necessarily constant across newspapers. The reputational penalty for publishing false information borne by the New York Times, for example, will probably exceed the one borne by The National Enquirer. The harm from publication, h, also will generally depend on the newspaper's reputation for accuracy. 15 We assume that a story is either true or false, and accordingly that investment in verification produces a binary signal: true or false. While this assumption seems reasonable in many cases, there are other cases where a story's truthfulness or accuracy lies on a continuum, and where verification can improve a story's measure of accuracy. Our model can be adjusted to capture this category of cases. The investment x can be viewed as producing greater accuracy, thus increasing the probability that the story as a whole will pass a threshold of accuracy that leads to exemption from liability. 16 It is often argued that value of the information is contingent upon its timely publication. This temporal effect can be explicitly modeled by defining the social benefit as a function of time, i.e. b = b(t) . However, our model, with the constant b, also captures the need for timely publication, but through the specification of the verification technology. Assume that the verification process can always be accelerated albeit with an additional cost. Hence, if timely publication is important, this will translate in our model either to (1) a higher optimal level of verification; or, if the verification technology is less effective, to (2) a choice between publication and no publication without verification. 17 Specifically,
On the other hand, if s = f, the newspaper's posterior is:
. This is a unique feature of the assumed verification technology.)
The prior φ is updated by a multiple of 
The prior φ is updated by a multiple of
. Clearly, if s = f the posterior is smaller than the prior, and indeed ) ( x m cannot exceed one. Also, as can be expected the amount of updating (in absolute value) is increasing in the level of verification, i.e.
is not a function of the prior φ .
III. SOCIALLY OPTIMAL VERIFICATION AND PUBLICATION
The newspaper should choose from the following three strategies: (1) invest in verification and publish if and only if s = t; (2) refrain from any verification and publish the information; and (3) refrain from any verification and not publish the information. Clearly, if investment in verification is socially desirable, then it is optimal to make use of the added information generated by the verification process, and publish if and only if s = t. If it is optimal to publish regardless of the signal, or not to publish regardless of the signal, then there is no point investing in verification. We now derive the conditions, under which each one of the three strategies is optimal.
If the newspaper invests x in verification, and publishes the information if and only if s = t, the expected social welfare is
When the initial information is true, the probability of receiving the correct s = t signal equals the probability of obtaining an informative signal, ) (x P , plus the probability that a non-informative signal will turn out to be correct by chance,
. Upon receiving an s = t signal, the newspaper will publish the information, leading to a net social welfare increase of b -h. When the initial information is false, the probability of receiving an incorrect s = t signal equals the probability that a non-informative signal will produce the value t by chance,
. Upon receiving an s = t signal, the newspaper will publish the information, leading to a welfare loss of h.
If the newspaper does not invest in verification, but nevertheless publishes the information, the expected social welfare is
. If the newspaper does not invest in verification, and does not publish the information, the expected social welfare is 0 = NP W . Based on these observations, the following proposition characterizes the socially optimal investment in verification, as well as the socially optimal publishing decision.
Proposition 1: Define x as the level of investment, which satisfies the condition
(
The optimal investment, * x , and publishing decision are -
N should publish the information if and only if s = t. (ii)
If
and N should publish the information regardless of the signal s.
and N should not publish the information regardless of the signal s.
Remarks: The intuition for this result, which is proved in the appendix, is as follows.
Starting with condition (1), a central observation is that investment in verification does not affect the probability of publication, which is also the probability that harm will occur. While a higher investment in verification increases the probability that true information will be published, it also reduces the probability that false information will be published. It turns out that these two effects are of equal magnitude, and thus cancel out. 19 As a result, the overall probability of publication is unaffected by the level of verification.
While the overall probability of publication, and thus also the probability of inflicting harm, is unaffected by the level of verification, the probability of making (ex post) correct publication decisions are certainly affected by the newspaper's verification efforts. As the level of investment in verification rises, the probability of publishing true information increases, and the probability of publishing false information decreases. In particular, the probability that true information will be published equals
, where φ is the probability that the information is true, ) (x P is the probability that an informative signal will obtain and (
is the probability of a correct random signal. A higher investment in verification increases the probability of receiving an informative signal and publishing the true information, but it also reduces the probability receiving a non-informative signal and publishing the true information. Still, the former effect dominates, so that the investment in verification increases the overall probability that true information will be published. The net effect of the level of investment in 19 Consider the following two cases. First, considering true information, the newspaper will publish the information with probability
where φ is the probability that the information is true, ) (x P is the probability that an informative signal will obtain and (
is the probability of a correct random signal. Second, considering false information, the newspaper will publish the information with probability ( )
is the probability that the information is false and (
is the probability of an incorrect random signal. A higher investment in verification increases the probability of receiving an informative signal and publishing the true information, but it also reduces the probability of receiving a noninformative signal and publishing either true or false information. These effects cancel out, such that overall the investment in verification does not affect the probability that the harm will be incurred. It should be noted, however, that this results depends on our assumptions regarding the verification technology. In particular, we assume symmetric verification in the sense that the verification technology is identical for true information and for false information. With an asymmetric verification technology, the level of verification may affect the overall probability of publication.
verification, x, on the probability that true information will be published is
. Indeed, the level of investment in verification affects social welfare only by determining the probability that true information will be published, which in turn results in a social benefit of b. As long as the marginal increase in welfare,
, is greater than the marginal cost of verification, 1, the newspaper should increase the level of verification. This result is captured by condition (1), which defines x .
Parts (i)-(iii) of proposition 1 follow immediately from the definitions of ) (x W V , P W and NP W , coupled with the optimality of x , given the social desirability of verification. Part (i) of the proposition states the condition under which it is socially optimal to invest in verifying the information. Part (ii) of the proposition states the condition under which it is socially optimal to publish the information without any verification. Finally, part (iii) of the proposition states the condition, under which it is socially optimal not to publish the information (without verification).
A simple comparative statics exercise based on condition (1) confirms the following intuitions. First, the positive welfare effect of verification increases in the magnitude of the benefits derived from publication of true information, i.e., b.
. Second, the effect of verification decreases as the prior distribution of true versus false information becomes more informative. In particular, the benefits of verification disappear as φ approaches either zero or one, and these benefits are maximal when 
and the choice is between investing in verification and publishing when s = t, and either publishing or not publishing without verification, where the latter two options are equivalent from a social welfare perspective. In the remainder of the paper, we pay little attention to these borderline indifference cases. caused by such publication, h, the strategy of publishing without verification dominates the strategy of not publishing (with zero verification). Therefore, the remaining choice is between, on the one hand, verification followed by a publication decision which depends on the results of the verification process, and, on the other hand, publication without verification. The choice between these two strategies depends on the efficacy of the verification process.
(ii) When the ex ante expected benefits from publication, b ⋅ φ , are smaller than the harm caused by such publication, h, the strategy of not publishing (with zero verification) dominates the strategy of publishing without verification. Therefore, the remaining choice is between, on the one hand, verification followed by a publication decision which depends on the results of the verification process, and, on the other hand, simply no publication (without verification). Again, the choice between these two strategies depends on the efficacy of the verification process.
The optimal verification and publication decisions depend on the benefit from truthful publication, b, on the level of harm, h, and on the a-priori probability of truthfulness, φ , as described in the following corollary.
it is socially optimal to refrain from publication without any verification.
is socially optimal to verify the information and base the publication decision on the results of the verification process; in this region the optimal level of verification is increasing in b, specifically
0 ) ( ' ' ) ( ' > ⋅ − = ∂ ∂ x P b x P b x . (iii) b b ≥ ∀ it
is socially optimal to publish the information without any verification. The threshold values, b and b , are functions of h, satisfying:
Remarks: The proof of corollary 2 is provided in the appendix. The intuition for these results is based on the preceding observations. 22
The results stated in corollary 2 are represented graphically in figure 1. Figure 2 presents the b -h parameter space divided into three regions, each corresponding to one of the three strategies: publication without verification, publication based on verification and no publication (without verification). 22 Threshold values similar to b and b can be derived on the h dimension as well as on the φ dimension. However, the b dimension is of special interest, as explained below. Importantly, as the verification process becomes more effective the middle region in figure 2 , where verification is socially desirable, becomes increasingly dominant.
IV. THE NEWSPAPER'S PROBLEM
This Section studies the newspaper's verification and publication decisions under alternative liability regimes. Specifically, when N decides to publish information, it faces a monetary sanction of d if the published information turns out to be false (we assume that ex post courts are able to determine the value of i). 23 Recall that harm is also caused by a truthful publication. Nevertheless, following the current legal doctrine, we assume that the newspaper is liable only if the information turns out to be false.
As in the social welfare optimization problem of section III, the newspaper will choose from the following three strategies: (1) invest in verification and publish if and only if s = t; (2) refrain from any verification and publish the information; and (3) refrain from any verification and not publish the information. 23 The newspaper may also suffer a reputational penalty following the publication of false information. The analysis can be readily adjusted to allow for this possibility. See also note 14 above. In fact, the structure of the newspaper's private optimization problem is identical to the structure of the social welfare optimization problem, subject to the following adjustments. In the newspapers' problem publication of truthful information produces a payoff of π , rather than the net benefit, h b − , in the social welfare problem. And, publication of false information produces a payoff of d − π in the newspaper's problem, rather than the cost, h − , in the social welfare problem. Put differently, in both the social welfare problem and the newspaper's problem, we distinguish between two payoff categories: (1) truth-dependent payoffs, and (2) truth-independent payoffs. In the social welfare problem, the benefit, b, is truth-dependent, while the harm, h, follows from the publication of true, as well as false, stories. In the newspaper's problem, the profit, π , does not depend on the truthfulness of the story, but damages (d) will be paid only if the story turns out to be false.
Based on these observations, and building on the analysis in section III, we can now characterize the solution to the newspaper's optimization problem. We first derive the newspaper's payoffs given each one of the three strategies. If the newspaper chooses to invest in verification and publish if and only if s = t, its payoff will be:
( )
. If the newspaper publishes without verification, its payoff will be: 
and N will publish the information if and only if s = t. (ii)
and N will publish the information regardless of the signal s.
and N will not publish the information regardless of the signal s.
Remarks:
The intuition for this result, which is proved in the appendix, is similar to the intuition described in the remarks following proposition 1.
A simple comparative statics exercise based on condition (2) 
Corollary 3:
and thus the newspaper's choice is between investing in verification and publishing when s = t, and not investing at all and publishing the information nevertheless. (ii)
When
and thus the newspaper's choice is between investing in verification and publishing when s = t, and not investing at all and not publishing the information.
Remarks: The proof of corollary 3 is immediate from proposition 2. The intuition for this result is similar to the intuition described in the remarks following corollary 1.
As described in the following corollary, the newspaper's verification and publication decisions depend on the damages from false publication, d, on the profit level, π , and on the a-priori probability of truthfulness, φ .
the newspaper will publish the information without any verification. 
newspaper will verify the information and base its publication decision on the results of the verification process; in this region the newspaper's privately optimal level of verification is increasing in d, specifically
Remarks: The proof of corollary 4 is similar to the proof of corollary 2. The intuition for this result is based on the preceding observations. 25
The results stated in corollary 4 are represented graphically in figure 3 . Figure 4 presents the d -π parameter space divided into three regions, each corresponding to one of the three strategies: publication without verification, publication based on verification and no publication (without verification). 24 The threshold values, d and d , are also functions of φ . The functional relationship between the threshold values and φ is, however, more subtle and less instructive. 25 Threshold values similar to d and d can be derived on the π dimension as well as on the φ dimension. As explained below, however, the d dimension is of special interest.
Not publish Importantly, as the verification process becomes more effective the middle region in figure 4 , where the newspaper chooses to verify the initial information, becomes increasingly dominant.
V. INDUCING OPTIMAL VERIFICATION AND PUBLICATION DECISIONS
Section V explores the possibility of inducing socially desirable verification and publication decisions using a liability regime. We first show, in subsection A, that setting damages equal to harm, as current doctrine requires, cannot achieve the efficient outcome. We further demonstrate that any one-dimensional damage measure cannot achieve the socially desirable outcome. Then, in subsection B, we proceed to derive a more context-dependent liability rule that can induce efficient behavior on both verification and publication dimensions.
A. One-Dimensional Damages Measures
We first demonstrate that the traditional liability rule, which sets damages equal to harm whenever the published information turns out to be false, cannot achieve the first best outcome. Remarks: The intuition for this result, whose proof follows immediately from a comparison of the results stated in propositions 1 and 2, is as follows. (i) When the verification process is effective, it is socially optimal to invest x in verification, and to publish the information if and only if the verification process confirms the information (proposition 1(i)). Since the verification process is effective, the newspaper will indeed invest in verification and publish the information if and only if the verification process confirms the information (proposition 2(i)), but the newspaper's investment will be N x , rather than x .
Comparing conditions (1) and (2) (ii) When the verification process is ineffective, it is socially desirable to refrain from verification. Instead, it is desirable to base the publication decision on a comparison between the expected benefit from publication and the harm caused by publication (proposition 1, parts (ii) and (iii)). However, if damages are set equal to harm, and the harm is sufficiently large, the newspaper may be induced to invest in verification. Moreover, even if the newspaper does not invest in verification, its publications decisions will generally be distorted. If the harm is sufficiently large, the newspaper may fear liability and refrain from publication, even when the expected benefit from publication is greater than the harm. Conversely, when the magnitude of the harm is low, the newspaper may publish the information, even when the relatively small harm is still greater than the expected benefit from publication.
While proposition 3 focuses on the traditional one-dimensional damage measure, d = h, its logic clearly extends to any one-dimensional damage measure. The complexity of the libel problem renders such an inflexible rule inadequate. As emphasized above, the combination of positive and negative externalities in the libel context require legal intervention to control two decisions, the verification decision and the publication decision. A single damage measure cannot induce optimal behavior on both the verification and publication dimensions.
B. Optimal Liability for Libel
Having confirmed that setting damages to equal harm (or to any other onedimensional measure) cannot induce optimal behavior, we now proceed to characterize the optimal liability regime. (ii)
If the verification process is ineffective, i.e., 0
, then the damage award should be set to equal
, then the damage award should be set sufficiently high to ensure
(i) If the verification process is sufficiently effective, then it is both socially optimal and privately profitable for the newspaper to verify the information, and to condition publication on the results of the verification process (namely to publish if and only if s = t). Given that verification is profitable for the newspaper, the condition d = b guarantees that the newspaper will choose the optimal level of investment in verification,
Formally, this last result follows directly from the identity between conditions (1) and (2), which is achieved by substituting d = b into condition (2).
The intuition behind the 'damages equal to benefit' result can be explained as follows. Verification is socially desirable to the extent that it increases the probability of enjoying b. In other words, the social role of verification is to reduce the probability that true information will not be published. Thus, the social effect of verification is given by
, where φ is the ex ante probability that the information is true and (
is the probability that a noninformative signal will prevent publication.
Similarly, verification is privately profitable to the newspaper to the extent that it reduces the probability that d will be incurred. Put differently, the private effect of verification is to reduce the probability that false information will be published. Thus, the private effect of verification is given by
is the ex ante probability that the information is false and (
is the probability that a non-informative signal will lead the newspaper to publish this false information.
Comparing the social effect of verification,
, and the private effect of verification, ( ) (
, it is clear that the investment in verification affects the probability of enjoying b in the social optimization problem in precisely the same way that it affects the probability of incurring d in the newspaper's optimization problem.
(ii) If the verification process is ineffective, then it will often be both socially and privately (for the newspaper) optimal not to verify the information. Still, given zero verification, the question remains: should the newspaper publish the information? If h b > ⋅ φ , it is socially optimal for the newspaper to publish the information (without verification) (proposition 1(ii) and corollary 1(i)). The newspaper will publish the information (without verification), if
(proposition 2(ii) and corollary 3(i)). Setting the damage award equal
. A similar result can be achieved by including an exemption from liability, i.e., d = 0, when the expected benefits from publication outweigh the resulting harm (and verification is ineffective).
, it is socially optimal for the newspaper to refrain from publication (without verification) (proposition 1(iii) and corollary 1(ii)). The newspaper will not publish the information (without verification), if
(proposition 2(iii) and corollary 3(ii)). Setting the damage award equal to The efficacy of the verification process lies at the center of this liability regime. When the verification process is effective, damages should be set to equal the benefit from truthful publication. When verification is ineffective, a secondorder choice between no liability (or zero damages) and high damages is required. This choice should depend on the relative magnitudes of the harm from publication and the expected benefit from truthful publication.
The liability regime set forth in proposition 4 will often induce efficient verification and publication decisions. It must be recognized, however, that the proposed regime will not always achieve the first-best outcome. The results stated in proposition 4 are conditional on the premise that when verification is effective it will be both socially and privately optimal to invest in verification, and conversely that when verification is ineffective it will be both socially and privately optimal not to invest in verification. But this premise may not always be valid. For example, when damages equal the social benefit from publication, it is possible that, while verification is socially desirable, the newspaper will find it privately optimal not to publish the story (without verification). 26 Nevertheless, since both 26 This may happen if the social benefit from publication, and accordingly also the damage measure, are very large compared to the newspaper's profits from publication. On the other hand, if the social benefit from publication, and accordingly also the damage measure, are small compared to the newspaper's profits from publication, the newspaper may publish the story without verification, when it is socially optimal to invest in verification. However, since the social and the private utility from verification depend on a common factor, the efficacy of the verification process, the proposed liability regime will generally induce socially desirable behavior.
VI. DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS
The model studied in the previous sections provides insight as to the relevant considerations for devising an optimal liability regime for the tort of libel. The analytical results derived within the formal model do not immediately translate into doctrinal rules. Nevertheless, these results can help guide the courts in developing the law of libel.
Moreover, existing doctrinal tools can be reinterpreted to promote efficient verification and publication in accordance with our theory.
The public -private distinction is a central tenet of current libel law. Specifically, the doctrine distinguishes between information pertaining to public figures (or public issues) and information pertaining to private figures (or private issues). This distinction determines the severity of the fault required as a precondition for the imposition of liability. Yet, the courts have been struggling to understand the true essence of the public -private distinction. 27 Our theory can assist the courts in identifying the proper contours of the public and private domains. In particular, our model suggests that a comparison between the harm from publication, h, and the expected benefit from truthful publication, b ⋅ φ , should guide the public -private distinction.
Moreover, the public -private distinction can be utilized to promote efficient verification and publication, in accordance with our theory. For instance, the "private" category can be reinterpreted as including cases where the harm, h, is greater than the expected benefit, b ⋅ φ , to the extent that it is socially desirable to refrain from publication without verification. Thus, imposing a high level of damages for publication of private information would induce a socially desirable outcome (see part (ii) of proposition 4).
presumably the newspaper's profits are positively correlated with the benefit from publication, the proposed regime will generally induce efficient outcomes. 27 The Sullivan court stressed the distinction between public figures and private figures. This distinction was soon refined in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker (388 U.S. 130 (1967) ), where the Court differentiated between official public figures (for whom the "actual malice" requirement applies) and non-official public figures (for whom a "gross negligence" standard is sufficient). The plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. (403 U.S. 29 (1971) (Brennan, J.)) then deviated from the public figure -private figure distinction, placing more weight on the question whether the information pertains to matters of public concern (even when not concerning public figures). In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (418 U.S. 323 (1974) ) the Court repudiated the Rosenbloom holding shifting the focus back to the distinction between public figures and private figures. Later on, the Court ruled that "limited-purpose public figure" is sufficient to trigger the "actual malice" requirement (Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) ).
The fault standards adopted by the Supreme Court as a precondition for the imposition of liability for libel may also be reinterpreted to promote efficient verification and publication in accordance with our theory. 28 Specifically, consider the class of cases where verification is ineffective and the expected benefit, b ⋅ φ , is greater than the harm, h, so that it is socially desirable to publish the information without verification. If publication without any verification in such circumstances is defined as free of fault, leading to an exemption from liability, the socially desirable outcome will be attained (see part (ii) of proposition 4). Indeed, it seems quite natural to include the efficacy of the verification process as a central criterion in the determination of fault. Hence, current law has the tools to protect publication without verification when it is socially desirable to do so. But can the law induce efficient verification in the significant class of cases where some positive investment in verification is warranted? It is in this class of cases, where our analysis suggests a slightly more radical departure from existing doctrine. Rather than the conventional "damages equal harm" measure, we advocate a seemingly counter-intuitive damage measure, namely setting damages equal to the benefit from truthful publication (see part (i) of proposition 4).
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper studied the characteristics of an efficient liability regime for libel. Existing literature has generally recognized that the nature of speech as a public good might produce overdeterrence of publishers. By explicitly considering the two distinct decisions faced by publishers -the verification and the publication decisions -our analysis demonstrated that the incentives faced by publishers are far more complicated than previously acknowledged. While publishers will be over-cautious in their publication decisions, they will tend to under-invest in verifying the accuracy of the stories they publish.
The model developed in this paper provides several findings concerning the efficient libel regime. First, a regime based on a single damages measure cannot ensure both efficient verification and efficient publication decisions. Furthermore, as a matter of theory, inducing publishers to exercise socially optimal verification might require courts, under certain circumstances, to set damages to equal the social benefits produced by a truthful publication. Finally, a key step in implementing the efficient regime derived in this paper is inquiring about the efficacy of verification prior to publication. Turning these findings into practical legal rules is undoubtedly a difficult task. Nevertheless, the insights provided by our model can play a valuable role in any attempt to reform the puzzling jurisprudence of libel.
APPENDIX -PROOFS
The appendix collects the proofs of the propositions and corollaries that were presented in the paper.
Proof of Proposition 1: Condition (1), which defines the optimal investment in verification, when verification is socially desirable, is simply the FOC of the optimization problem ) ( max , where ( )
Given the optimal non-zero level of verification, α should be calibrated to ensure that the newspaper will not find it (privately) optimal to invest in verification. QED
